Introduction

Turkey is renowned for its strict and proud secularist government and supporting nation, however since the rising popularity of political Islam, Islamization and growing friendliness form the public towards the Middle East, the Turkish public have become unsettled and this has had many affects on women. Several constitutional changes and rising numbers of religious movements have created ‘two-faces’ of Turkey.

While the top down Kemalist ideology loses popularity in Turkey the bottom up ruling style of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) gains prevalence with the majority of the public. With this sudden popularity and eye-catching style and work ethics of the JDP, it is understandable why questions are being asked about the JDP’s real agenda for Turkey and its people.

The worries about the JDP’s motivation by the protectors and supporters of the secular state include fears of the JDP’s intention to turn Turkey into an Islamic state and obliterate the Kemalist ideology and legacy. Islamization of the education system, regulations on women’s dress code, and Erdogan’s growing authoritarianism are just a few among the great apprehensions felt by modern liberal thinkers and secular state supporters (Toledano, p 45, 2011).

As Mneimneh (2011) has stated many are certain of a hidden agenda and do not fall for the claims of the AKP that they are non Islamist, Mneimneh also claims that many especially Arab Islamists believe that the JDP’s claims regarding their political stance in secular Turkey are just ‘temporary political necessities designed to conceal the party’s true identity and intentions’ (p.13, 2011).

Islam being associated with backwards thinking, inequality and undemocratic by the west (especially prevalent during the European Union negotiations with Turkey), western press has also printed and reported the ‘dangers’ Turkey is facing with the JDP government, hence sparking more anxiety within the Turkish public, or hostility towards the west depending on the side one supports (Brusse et al, p.51, 2004).

The above claims regarding the Islamization of Turkey have parked up several arguments and debates about how women will be affected in these circumstances. Ataturk is well known for granting rights for women in Turkey before most western countries, however the question of whether having a conservative party ruling the country will create a further gap between the sexes is indefinite. 

My content of this paper will therefore represent the research into how women’s positions and participation in politics and society have changed. The changes towards modernization and recognizing more rights for women at the government level with law changes and reforms are undeniable, however as accession negotiations to enter the EU have taken a centre spot in the JDP’s political agenda, it is apparent that the only reforms made by the government are ones which directly relate to the criticisms stated in the EU Progress Reports for Turkey. Some issues, which have been addressed by the JDP due to the criticisms from Europe, are for such issues as honour killings, education for girls and unequal treatment of women in workplaces. 

With this paper I aim to identify the current positions of women in politics and society and analyze, the implementation of laws regarding women’s right and how the mentality of the JDP affects the implementation and therefore restrict the progress regarding female participation in politics and society. Establishing first where the JDP came from and their ideology will help the flow of the paper and ease the understanding of the current situation. It is in my best intentions to distinguish the JDP philosophy from Islam itself, as the JDP actions do not necessarily represent Islam, but involve traditionalistic thinking as well as anti western, anti democratic, and anti feminist approaches to implementing laws, policies and in spreading their belief in ‘proper’ social behaviour.

To begin with, an overview of Turkeys shift to extreme right politics is discussed and critically analyzed regarding its affect on society and women. From the end of the 1960’s Turkish politics changed dramatically and directly influenced the position of women in society. Many female supporters of the JDP have historical ties to Islamist parties prevalent in that era and have helped shape the JDP into what they are now, therefore it is important for me to begin with this analysis.

The chapter on Erdogan and the JDP follows; in this section I have provided information on Erdogans background, JDP ideology and theoretical approaches to JDP social politics. Neo Liberalism is a term that is evident in this study and provides supportive evidence while analyzing the actions of the party. Even though Erdogan comes from broken up and banned radical Islamist parties, he states he has changed and believes in democracy and equality (Esen, 2011). I believe by assessing his past as well his present sentiment towards women and their place in society will give a more accurate conclusion. However not only Erdogans past is alarming, many members of the AKP have ties with the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), the Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi, SP), groups and Islamist movements such as the Gulen Movement, Haydar Bas Movement, Suleymanci, Brotherhood, the Nurcu brotherhood and the popular Naksibenci Brotherhood (Devrim, 2011).

My paper continues with an analysis of the evolution of women’s movements in Turkey, very briefly stretching to the Ottoman reformation period (1839-76). Women’s movements, feminist activism and NGO’s supporting rights for women have played an important role in modernizing Turkey. They have showed strength, will and motivation and are the major players in all movements regarding modernization and democratization. The nature of Turkish culture is a conservative one, nonetheless, the modernization process began by using women as tools for westernization and modern discourse. The empowerment of women has had a direct affect in shaping social policies and they are still fighting now. This section is also important in the sense that it touches upon feminism, which is very frowned upon by the current leadership.

The chapter on women will show the reader detailed analysis of the participation of women in politics and society. The trend in women’s participation in pro Islamic politics is controversial in itself (Sahin, 2011). Sahin also mentions that women’s involvement in politics have become a top priority in Islamic politics since the 1990s, the empowerment of women gained through this opportunity led to more inclusion and participation of pro Islamic women in politics in the 2000s (p.2, 2011). This has especially been apparent during the debates of the headscarf politics. This chapter is split in to two parts. The first analyses the current position of women in politics and JDP’s theoretical framework, it also discusses the participation of women’s groups in trying to increase the amount of female parliamentarians. Sozen’s three types of JDP women are also analyzed, this gives us a better insight in the type of women who support the leadership and who do not. 

The second section refers to women in society and how they are perceived and their position in public. It also touches upon the rights of women within their private sphere; the household. You are able to read about the constitutional changes made by the JDP and the level of implementation of these laws. 

The JDP’s mixed politics using conservatism and liberalism makes this study very significant. The excellent reformations and changes in constitutions to democratize Turkey is witnessed parallel to the lack of implementation of these policies due to a traditionalistic mentality spread by JDP members. This mentality has also translated into the public and has empowered the conservative majority, through this we see women being subordinated figures and women who are expected to stay at home and have three children.

Turkey’s political direction towards the right

Discussing Turkeys shift towards to the right in a political context is an important step in understanding the evolution of women’s movements in Turkey. Associating Islamic or more appropriately for this context conservative politics to women’s rights is a common fact. Regardless of the religion of the state, practicing conservative politics has been a feeding ground for activism for the rights of women. The 1980s was a monumental era for Turkish politics, with battles between leftist and rightist activists; however the contribution of women’s groups including feminists and Islamists for the democratization of Turkish politics could not be missed (Arat, 1998).

Turkey has been facing a major conundrum since the late 19^th century early 20^th century; the increasing face of secularism verses the traditionalist nature of the Turkish culture. This has in turn developed into the two faces of Turkey we see today.

The establishment of the republic in 1923 was an attempt made by the great Ataturk to secularize the society and of course the polity (Heper & Toktas, 2003, p157). With the fall of the Ottoman Empire an opportunity arose for Ataturk to take ‘cues from the teachings of the Enlightenment’ (Heper & Toktas, 2003, p157) and create a new Turk who thought rationally rather than stay as dogmatic thinkers. This developed a form of Muslim Secularism, as a whole this Turkish version of secularism had been a successful one; the public had managed to keep their religious and spiritual beliefs as a way of life in a private sphere. While still loyal to their religion the Turkish public also adopted the secular discourse.

Turkey’s adoption of secular discourse and religion as a system of belief has resulted in Turkey being the sole Muslim nation recognizing democracy ‘as the only game in town’ (Lewis, 1994, p42). 

Since the birth of the Republic Turkish Kemalist nationalism has been a major player not only in the context of politics but in the hearts of the people too. Ataturk is grand figure in Turkish society and the threat of losing that identity causes grave concern to safe keepers of the Turkish secular identity. The headscarf missionaries, the traditionalist mentality and strong political parties supporting those ideas have been growing and gaining strength since 1969. The start of the 70’s shows a greater struggle between the discourse of authenticity and Kemalist nationalism. Authenticity in this context refers to preserving Islamic principles and values (Chrona & Capelos, 2010). 

The religiously orientated National Order Party (NOP), a party, which represents a branch of the Nakshibendi religious order, often called a cult or a tarikat, initiated this ideology. The analyses of the NOP brought to light their goal, which was to revive the moral principles of the Ottoman times, where the public lived in accordance of the principles of the then interpreted Shari’ah (Heper & Toktas, 2003, p158).

Since the commencement of political Islamist discourse there have been many successors to the NOP including the National Salvation Party, the Welfare Party and the Virtue Party. Although they drifted away slightly from the initial message of the NOP, they were still successful in gaining power within the people.

Necmettin Erbakan is a name that should spring to mind instantly when one speaks of Islamist orientated politics in Turkey. He was one of the founders of the NOP and continued Islamist politics even after the NOP was closed down by the military in 1971. His major success was during the operation of the Welfare Party. Erbakan re organized his followers and created the Welfare Party in 1983 after yet another ban to his political activity, this time with the closing down of his National Salvation Party (1973 – 1980), during the 1980 coup d’état. The National Salvation Party was in a coalition leadership with the Republican People’s Party in 1974 and then another two coalition leaderships with the Justice Party in 1977 and 1978. During the 1974 coalition, the battle between the secularists and the Islamists gained force, and came to breaking point when the NSP ordered a statue of a naked woman (which was very symbolic to Istanbul residents) to be brought down.

The coup d’état lasted three years and the political ban Erbakan was faced with ended when General Evren stepped down and the Motherland Party with Turgut Ozal had the new leadership.

The military took control in 1980 to protect Turkey’s secularist and nationalistic identity, to save it from anarchy and to stop inequality and to prevent hundreds more deaths from occurring, however any new reforms they brought in had to be government bound. This created hostility from groups in society as Capezza stated ‘the military dominated most aspects of society, taking strict control of universities, dismissing or transferring academics, depoliticizing the public service system, and dissolving existing political parties. In essence, the military enforced martial law to ensure public safety.’ (2009, p15). 

The problem with this type of control is that women’s groups and societies were also bound to the government, which was and is still male-dominated (Cosar & Ozman, 2010). Through the growing fear of Marxism in Turkish society, the military’s action plan consisted of bringing back Islamic values and grabbing the public’s attention through the fear of God (Tezcur, 2009). It was during this new strategy, Islamism in Turkish politics started to creep back in. Under the military control; religious schools, new mosques and Qur’an courses were opened; they were however, as with other societies bound to the government. They wanted to make sure the public was being taught the information that was regulated by the rulers of the country (Tezcur, 2009).  

The Welfare party was active after the ban was lifted from Erbakan in 1983 through the rest of the 80’s and grew in strength and gained voters at a very brisk speed; by 1995 it had captured 21.4 % of the national votes and won 158 parliamentary seats (Ozbudun, 2006, p544).

The nature of Erbakan and his followers had varying opinions from the public. As a traditionalist party with very conservative views it was surprising to see many women activists working in favour of Erbakan and the Welfare party. The party adopted many religious and non-religious agendas. The party was very much involved in prioritizing issues such as ‘industrialization, social justice, honest government, and the restoration of Turkey’s former grandeur.’ (Ozbudun, 2006, p544). 

During the Welfare Party’s golden years, the current Turkish Prime minister was elected as the head of Beyoglu district Branch in 1985. Erdogan has been active in politics since 1969 and began his political career in the National View Association, connected to both the NOP and the National Salvation Party (NSP). Erdogans success was even more prevalent when he was elected as the Istanbul metropolitan mayor in 1994. During Erdogans service of mayor, the voice of Islamist women grew, the womans branch grew from strength to strength, and this resulted in the Welfare party gaining one million female members by the second half of the 1990s (ESI, 2007). He provided new services for women including education and working opportunities outside of the home; the latter was especially effective. According to a study published by the European Stability Initiative (2007) women who wear headscarves and are married into traditionalist families are unsatisfied with sitting at home and there being nowhere suitable to their mind frame and religious beliefs to work in. During the late 1980’s and through the 1990’s, Islamist women were feeling more and more liberated, the support they were acquiring from the Welfare party and especially Erdogan’s innovative projects. According to a study conducted by White in the 1990’s, traditionalist men felt it was the woman’s body that represented family honour, therefore without covering the woman was not able to penetrate society. The same ideology was found in Islamist women too, they supported the Welfare party’s cause and stated that with the recognition of Islamism in Turkish society they were able to join public life and become useful members of Turkish society (ESI, 2007, p11).

 With Erdogans initiative Islamist women are gaining experience and have a chance to work out of the house with the consent of her husband, through this project and others similar Erdogan increased the popularity of the Welfare party (ESI, 2007). 

He served as mayor until 1998, and was imprisoned for almost five months for spreading anti secular messages. Once his ban from active politics was lifted Erdogan was central in forming the Virtue Party, then moving on to more moderate centre right politics with the Justice and Development Party in 2001.

The Background to Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party (JDP).

The JDP is a centre right political party holding leadership in Turkey, founded by Recep Tayyip Erdogan and has relished in a sudden rise since its founding in 2001. The party was founded after Erdogan and several other politicians who once served for political Islamist parties. Both Erdogan and other party members who followed in his footsteps decided to leave their traditionalists and political Islamist backgrounds behind to pursue a more moderate agenda. 

The breakdown of political Islamism in Turkey resulted in many of the active members of political Islamism to be imprisoned; Erdogan being one of them, he decided to take off his Islamist ‘shirt’ and vowed to work towards a more democratic Turkish republic with the rest of the nation. The Islamist shirt is a style known to be worn by traditionalists, strict Muslims and Political Islamists. The way this shirt is worn is by buttoning up the shirt to the very top and not wearing a tie. It is usually worn with a jacket or a suit. According to Erbakan the tie represents westernization and Christianity, which is why it is frowned upon by Islamists. Erdogan’s grassroots political strategy has earned the respect of the majority of the Turkish public. His outreach to the working class (who hold a majority in Turkey) has led him to success. 

Within five years Erdogan and other party members have been able to change their stance from being anti Europe, anti modernisation, anti Westernisation, to being pro European Union, pro modernisation.

The Justice and Development party have successfully changed the discourse in Turkish politics since their leadership. As we have seen in the above chapter, Erdogan has shifted from the extreme right to the centre right. He is now practicing and leading the Justice and Development party into a conservative democratic political position.  The phases of Erdogan’s transition in his politically active life can be explained using neo-liberalism (Cosar & Yegenoglu, 2011). 

Assessment and criticisms of the JDP have been very diverse since their formation, especially since their first victory in 2002. Regardless of how much emphasis Erdogan and the rest of the party put on having no ties with political Islam their background and past affiliations with the National Outlook Movement (Milli Gorus Harekati), causes concern (Cosar and Yegenoglu, 2011). Erdogan’s once fascination with his ex mentor Necmettin Erbakan and his many speeches where he speaks so passionately about the dangers of Europeanization and his opposition to secularism are also reasons behind the claims that the party has “hidden intentions’ of putting an end to the secular state and social structure of the country” (Cosan and Yegenoglu, 2011, p1).

The JDPs coexisting policies, which come under both Muslim conservatism and liberal democratic principles can be understood using neoliberal characteristics. Duggan states that ‘neoliberalism works through coexisting, conflicting, shifting relations of power along multiple lines of difference and hierarchy’’ (2003, p70). If one translates these characteristics in regards to JDP’s politics a pattern concerning three components are present, Cosar & Yegenoglu argue that ‘socio-cultural conservatism, liberal free market discourse and nationalistic reflexes’ are evident (2011). The components were evident in past centre right politics however the success of the JDP came from a delicate balance of the three at both domestic and international issues. Erdogan emphasized the ‘existence of three political platforms in Turkey: Left, Conservative and liberal’ and stated that the most appropriate for Turkey is conservatism as ‘he believes in a collective politics rather than individual centered politics’ (Sozen, 2006, p270).

However, the contrasting elements of JDP politics are clear in their emphasis on having a pro liberal stance. This is evident in their keen attitude towards entering the European Union, also its assumption of ‘the least nationalist, the most pragmatic line’ (Uzgel, 2009, p379) in foreign policy-making in the past two decades and their position on the Cyprus issue, an ongoing problem (Firat, 2009). Cosar and Ozman also observed liberal principles in the JDP’s manner towards civil society (2004). JDP’s emphasis on individual rights for the headscarf issue is used by Islamists as a proof of their liberal stance for women’s rights, however that is the only policy we see that liberates women’s rights as individuals (there is further information on the headscarf politics in the case study below).

In regards to their nationalistic views, the JDP’s lack of dialogue with the Kurdish PDP party and the strict regulations on the freedom of thought in relation to offending the Turkish republic. Cosar and Yegenoglu argue that Erdogans and many members of the JDPs’ nationalistic characteristics are ‘fed from the Islamist appeal to the Ottoman-Islamist past as a defining characteristic of Turkish national identity’ (2011, p2).

The conservatist element of the party is the most conspicuous characteristic it upholds. However, regardless of the general agreement of the party’s conservative stance the views and analysis of their style of conservatism begs to differ. Yildiz believes that the majority of JDP’s voters are inherited from the National Outlook Movement and practices a self identified conservative democracy (Yildiz, 2008). Cinar argues that at the expense of liberal preferences the party leans towards an institutional conservatism (2008, p124). Yildiz explains an overall outlook of the assessments in the extract below:

with the majority of its party activists, many of its parliamentarians, and a bulk of its voters is the inheritor of the National Outlook. At the same time, with its ideological discourse, an important part of its parliamentary group, and a certain segment of its voters, it occupies a centre-right position in the political spectrum. (Yildiz, 2008, p43)

The JDPs pragmatic approach to politics cannot be argued, the ‘religious conservative, democratic, reformist and pro-European’ (Cizre 2008, p5) elements of their identity is a consequence of their pragmatism, their strategic use of ‘native sensitivities’ (Yildiz, 2008, p45) to appeal to the Turkish public and their morals was an element in their pragmatic strategy. 

In my analysis of the politics that characterizes the JDPs strategy a patchwork politics dimension is evident in the bigger picture. As Cosar also argues, this patchwork politics fits in with the neolibrealism experienced in Turkey (2011). The definition of patchwork politics I prefer to use for this context is the Cosar and Ozman explanation, which is the ‘pursuit of policies by disintegrating the political space into disconnected spheres of issue and disregarding the axes of junction among these spheres’ (2009, p53).

In regards to the status of women since their leadership, Cosar agues since their victory in 2002 we have witnessed  ‘conservatisation in socio-cultural and political spheres’ and that this conservation we speak of is  ‘processed through liberal strategies’, therefore the approach of the JDP on women’s issues can be ‘considered a testament to this process.’ (2011, p2).

I will be discussing the JDP’s gender policies and their attitudes to women further down in my case study.

The party’s election scores very vividly show the JDP’s success since their first major victory, which resulted in Turkey’s first single party majority government in over ten years. They gained leadership with over 34% of the votes in 2002, this figure increased to over 47% in the 2007 elections and Heper and Toktas state they established themselves ‘as the strongest party in Turkey’ (2003, p160). The 2007 elections, Tur argues magnified the JDPs’ and their supporters’ confidence (2007, p7). However, in the most recent elections in 2011 the party saw its grandest victory yet by securing almost 50% of the votes.

The strength of their women’s branch and the JDP’s grassroots political strategy has been major players in their success story. Erdogan’s ability to please the crowds and his ability to feed the conservative nature of the Turkish public through liberal strategies extended his supporters from outside the lower class traditionalist circle to the middle and upper class citizens, both women and men (Heper & Toktas, 2003, p161). Using Europeanization as a motivation, the several constitutional changes, which eliminate inequality in gender, increase in punishment for honour killings, domestic violence cases, and amplified support for women who have been victims of domestic violence, marital rape and other issues, which have marginalized women in Turkish society. 

In spite of the several positive legal changes, there is still a long way to go before Turkey reaches the position it should be protecting. Women have been very vocal during these processes and still continue to be, Yavuz (2006) argues despite the ‘powerful political language produced by women in daily life, the discourse on women in political circles has more cultural codes, and thus gender policies are rooted more culturally than they are politically (p258). This shows that the JDP must develop more than just politically. As we will see below, regardless of the amount of laws put into action, the implementation of these rules due to the mentality and cultural barriers of JDP members and supporters, justice is often impaired (Demirsu, 2010).

The Evolution of women’s movements in Turkish Society

In the publication Feminism in Turkey: a short history Sirman (1989) periodises three stages of women’s movements up until the end of the 1980’s. The first stage started in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire and was characterized by the ‘demand for women’s education’ (Çakır 1991) during the Tanzimat era. The Turkish republic saw stage two in Sirman’s periodisation of women’s movements; this era consisted of the formation of several independent feminist organizations in the late 20^th century. Despite the difficulties faced by women during the late 20^th Century women were still demanding equality. The third stage is the stage we are in at present times. This stage ‘is recognized at the neoliberal conservative patriarchy which characterizes the JDP politics’ (P6).

The evolution of modern Turkish thought on the question of women began to develop during the ‘Tanzimat’ or reformation period of the Ottoman Empire (1839 – 76). During the Tanzimat the question of women as the core of the modernization process, where the visibility of the woman was perceived as ‘being instruments of modernization’ (Kucukalioglu, 2005, p2). The frantic searches by the Ottomans to find radical measures to avoid the crumbling of the Empire, after several military defeats was marked by the Tanzimat period. Even though modernization women and the status of women in society seem to be a liberating step, this movement was very much shaped by male domination (Kucukalioglu, 2005). In this reformation period one of the most significant steps towards modernization were the publication aimed at women, these periodicals or newspapers were owned by men, and gave information about cooking, education, family life etc. The aim of these publications were to help create a modern wife and mother, understandably this concept is far from what feminists would call liberating, however it was the will and struggle of the Ottoman women who laid the first stepping stone in the process of liberating women (Demirdirek, 2000). A great example of the woman’s struggle to be recognized as equal humans came from Ulviye Meylan the editor of the Ottoman feminist publication Women’s World. Meylan ‘argued that men regarded women not as women but as female creatures who were subject to humiliation and that women were disregarded not only in the family but also everywhere in public’ (Kucukalioglu, 2005, p5). Meylan emphasized in her writings that women must be aware of their rights and be more conscious about their interest, she also argues that unless women are aware of the equality between the two sexes they cannot fight for their rights and gain a respectful position in society (Cakir, 1998).

As this thesis is not focused on the historical aspect of women’s movements, I will only go over the main points, which are relevant in understanding today’s situation. For more information on the historical roots of the evolution of women’s movements Elif Gözdasoglu Küçükalioglu has written a great piece called ‘The historical roots of the Women’s Movement’ and you can find it in ‘Turkey at the Crossroads: Women, Women’s Studies and The State’.

Therefore, the next milestone for a greater aspiration in women to fight for their rights came in 1908 when modernization and westernization became a priority. This marked a time when women were heard; Arat defined this very appropriately as ‘feminist aspirations shared among urban Ottoman women’ (1998). After the formation of the Republic of Turkey, it was in the best interest of the patriarchal politics of the republic to show a modern face using the bodies of women in the name of Europeanization. Therefore, Tekeli states that ‘it is not erroneous, therefore, to claim that the women’s revolution accomplished by the young Turkish Republic was in fact the result of these 50 years of activism by Ottoman women’ (2006, p194). In both the Ottoman milestone and up until after the late 1980’s women’s demands for equality and rights had to be ‘negotiated within the boundaries of republican patriarchy’ (Cosar & Yegenoglu, 2011, p4). The reason behind this, especially during the golden years of the new republic, they were certain that ‘women had “full equal status with men”, there was no need for a women’s organization (Tekeli, 2006, p194). Women’s rights groups at the time such as the Turkish Women’s Union was shut down by Ankara in 1935 and deemed as unnecessary. The patriarchal element of Turkish politics has been evident throughout the history of women’s movements, this is especially obvious in the gender policies of Kemalism; they are usually understood as ‘state feminism’ (Tekeli, 1986, p193).

In 1934 Turkish women were given the right to vote and stand as candidates for government posts at the national elections. In spite of the strict control of any society independently represent members of the public, the government set an unofficial quota, which provided some representation for women in government level. Consequently, from 1935 to 1950 the number of women parliamentarians rose to 4.5%, however that figure did not increase (Yilmaz, 2007).

After 1950, for a whole decade women’s representation in parliament reduced drastically, the multi party system was introduced and the unofficial quota was abandoned, 1960 witnessed a step towards the liberation of women in politics again, when the RPP opened a women’s branch. Other parties also followed, noticing the positive attributes of having a women’s branch. However, these women’s branches did not provide the political opportunities women had hoped for at both local and national levels, instead the women found themselves organization social events and activities (Gunes – Ayata, 1998).

The 1980 coup d’etat further impaired the rights women had to exercise their political voice. Women’s branches were closed down and all their political activities were banned until 1995. However, Turkish women refused to stop fighting and continued their organizations as charities with loose ties to their parties (Keskin, 1997). The proportion of women in government level positions decreased to fewer than four percent until 1995. This figure rose to just over four percent by 2002 (Yilmaz, 2007).

Women’s NGOS and charities have been extremely active throughout the timeline we have just seen. Organizations such as the Association for Supporting and Training Women Candidates (KA-DER Kadin Adaylari Destekleme ve Egitme Dernegi), Association for the Support of Contemporary Living (CYDD, Cagdas Yasami Desteleme Dernegi), and feminist organizations including Amargi; have been fighting to change the mentality in Turkish traditional discourse, to see more females in education and politics and to increase the amount of feminist discourse into everyday life.

During the JDP leadership we have seen some growth in female participation in politics education and in some aspects of society, CYDD representative Saliha Esen, stated in an interview that many assume the JDP are the sole reason behind the increased number of female participation in society, however it is organizations who are worried of the oppressive nature of their conservative politics and the increased number of headscarved women visible in society that put extra effort in to prevent any damage caused to the women of Turkey (2011.)

Analysis of Women’s position in Turkey since the AKP succeeded into power.

After establishing how women in Turkish society evolved, we have come to the present situation. Since AKPs victory in 2002, debates on whether Turkey is losing its nationalistic and secularist identity have been much more evident than in the past years. Erdogans background and affiliation with anti secular parties and traditionalistic individuals has caused concern in the minds of secular Turks. This concern has translated into Europe too, this debate and concern has added to the complications already present in their relationship. The angst stems from the apparent halt in Europeanization of the Turkish society and the increasing compassion towards the Middle East and conservative ideals.

The debate has not just caused a divide in society in general but within women too. Secular feminists support the fear of oppression through political Islam and the gradual loss of nationalistic identity. On the other side Islamist feminists, support the government and argue that it is their individual right to practice their religion as they please and wear the headscarf without any public barriers.

The headscarf issue is the centre of the debate between the two sides, while the secularists state that it is a political statement, the Islamists believe it to be an individual right to express ones belief. However as argued by Arin (2011) at an interview aired on Aljazeera the headscarf issue is a political statement, which is being used to pressure secularists out of being a majority, she also argues that as the amount of women who wears the headscarf accumulates the conservatism gains strength and secularism weakens. Arin states that as a feminist and activist for women’s rights, she is worried of the public image headscarved women portray. The JDP during their leadership until the present day have made it one of their priorities to address the headscarf politics, however liberal their attitude is towards the headscarf, they have shown nothing less than conservativism in other issues relating to women and family life. Erdogan’s arguments regarding the headscarf issue rests on the freedom to express individual rights (a necessity for a successful democratic regime) however individualism has not been evident in any other policy (Cosar & Yegenoglu, 2011, p11). 

The conservative community based politics of the JDP are evident in the strategies of their female supporters and members too. During the Welfare party campaigns their women’s were used ‘most effectively for its efficient party organization nationwide’ (Ayata & Tutuncu 2008, p369). The women members would gather together and visit potential supporters in their own homes, discuss female matters and other issues relating to that specific family. This same tactic was used to reach the poor. Ayata and Tutuncu, claim strongly that Erdogan ‘personally benefited from women’s work when he was running for the position of mayor of Istanbul in 1994’ and ‘that it was Erdoğan, not Erbakan, who had encouraged and made it possible for women to participate more actively in party politics (2008, p369).

Theoretical frameworks employed by scholars studying the headscarf issue have included modernization theory (Gole 1997), the theory of the public sphere (Sisman 2000), the theory of body politics (Cinar, 2008), and the postcolonial theory (Yegenoglu, 1998). (Sahin, 2011).

Women in Politics

Political participation of women in Turkish politics has been very limited. With the leverage of the European Union and the struggles for modernization and equal opportunities of women’s rights activists the opportunities for women to gain more liberation are increasing.

Feminist organizations in Turkey have had the gender quota on their agenda for over two decades. As Bacchi argues ‘Gender quotas are designed to increase women’s political participation, ‘aiming at equality of result, rather than equality of opportunity’ (2006, p33). However, the success rate of gender quotas for equality between men and women are as Reynolds claims dependant ‘on the degree to which quotas are taken seriously and implemented’ (1999, p549). With higher representation of women in parliament O’Regan argues that there is a higher likelihood that policies which matter to women will be implemented, such policies include rights to education and policies involving family and domestic matters (2000). This is the case we see in Turkey, the legalities of these issues are very apparent and in place, however it is the implementation that they lack. This shows a direct connection to the mentality of the members of parliament and representatives that are able to influence the public.

Marshall states that the discourse on gender quotas ‘centre on issues of liberalism, opportunity, competition, citizenship rights, and democracy’ (2011, p574). Despite the efforts of the feminist movements and female activists for the last several decades’ gender quotas became a publicly acknowledged issue in 2004 during the debates on the changes in the Constitution (Marshall, 2011).

The opportunity arose to put pressure on the JDP in 2004 when they were endeavouring to begin negotiations for European Union accession. Feminist women’s groups, female activists and politicians mainly from the opposition parties including the Republican Peoples Party fought for the amendments in the Constitution, Marshall states that with the ‘inclusion of a clause in the Constitution’ would result in ‘legal grounds for employing quota measures designed to increase women’s representation in politics’ (2011, p573). An unfortunate turn of events took place when the JDP refused to accept the clause and voted against it in staggering numbers.

At present day Turkey we see many parties in Turkish politics with gender quotas up to 50%, in spite of this we see that women are still substantially underrepresented, especially in higher parliamentary levels. In the JDP leadership one can see that ‘Women make up only 9% of parliamentary deputies’ (The Economist online, 2010) it is unsettling that ‘the proportion of women is at its historical maximum’ a very diminutive figure especially when one compares to other European countries Turkey should be at the level of (Marshall, 2011, p574). Cosar and Yegenoglu claim that the JDP compared to prior governments has swimmingly managed ‘the positioning of women in its central and local organisations as well as at parliamentary level’ (2011, p8). Sozen observed that Islamist women were only one side of the coin in female participation in the JDP; she claimed that modern secular females were being carefully selected to stand as members of parliament, the only stipulation being that they are sensitive to Islam (2006, p266/267) The above claim demonstrates Erdogan’s ferventness in reaching members of the public outside of the accustomed. 

Despite the increase in female participation in JDP politics and their eagerness to gain more female votes does not translate into the party being a pro women’s rights party Marshall, 2011, p575). Cosar and Yegenoglu state that the JDP’s ‘party’s evasive maneuvering in the face of feminist demands’ show lack of advocation to independent groups defending female rights (2011, p9). An example of this has been given by Cosar and Yegenoglu, they claim that the governments hesitation during their leadership to ‘include affirmative action as a constitutional provision and refrained from amending the Electoral Law and Law on Political Parties so as to make gender quotas legally binding’ (2011, p9). Consequently, from the viewpoint of a feminist there is no remodeling of the patriarchal method that is prevalent in Turkish politics but just shift in the style.

Sahin argues that the JDP’s intention to further women’s participation in partisan politics is to not confine them in the women’s branch only and involve them in the whole democratic process. This was no the case with the predeceasing Welfare and Virtue party’s where they had no women founders and confined the women who were members in their ‘Ladies’ Commissions’ (2011, p15). The female founding members of the JDP are seen to be married middle to upper class females who have educated backgrounds; these women have been monumental in increasing the female participation since the JDP leadership. Since 2002, thirty-four female members of the JDP have ‘held seats in the parliament’; Sahin questions the recruitment process and why and how these women were selected (2011, p15). Through interviews and observation Sahin notices that the female candidates have not been through similar selection processes, it is also revealed that a criteria for women candidates is to have a university degree, however this criteria was not expected to be fulfilled by male candidates (2011, p16). Another observation made by Sahin is the fact that ‘female candidates were placed in electable rankings’ meaning that the females only competed against each other and not other male candidates. This shows two things, one is that in the provinces where only females were candidates a woman would be definitely elected and it also shows that Erdogan did not have to replace a male candidate for the sake of the females. (Sahin, 2011 p18).

Feminists in general have criticized the AKP for its shortcomings in women’s representation. They have claimed that the party has been taking advantage of women’s hard work during elections but has not provided them with opportunities either in elected offices or in the party decision-making organs. Accordingly, the lack of a voluntary party quota has been considered a serious shortcoming, proving the party’s insincerity about women’s political empowerment. 

It is also argued by Marshall (2011) that the increase in the percentage of women’s participation in politics, regardless of the figure being the highest in the history of Turkish politics is not solely the accreditation of the JDP. The tactics the party upholds including placing female candidates or ‘using the zigzag model’ (Marshall, 2011, p575) cannot be held responsible for the nine percent female participation, but was mainly due to the struggles, campaigns and activism of women’s organizations, NGOs and charities.

As we can read from the above, there has been much opposition to JDP’s gender politics, however we see a contrasting image when female supporters and their viewpoints are analysed. Sozen discusses gender politics in Turkey using the characteristics of three types of women involved with the JDP, the first of the three are the Welfare party’s supporters, whose loyalty stems from the times of the National Salvation Party. Sozen describes them as ‘liberal women’ who have never entered the workforce but are supporting the Islamist agenda. They are different from westernized feminists in the sense that they are resisting male dominated modernity but long for ‘a just system in formed by Islam rather than revolt against male domination’ (2006, p259). However Sozen, a renowned sociologist expands her claims and explains that the aim behind the participation of this group of women follows a ‘sociopsychological’ method rather than a political agenda and the desire to be recognized as a typical Turkish woman, over the secular westernized modal. At the time these women adopted anti-secular, anti-western politics Erbakan was an obstruction to the participation of these women in politics, they were very limited in where they could voice their opinions; through the JDP Erdogan has been able to grant these women the confidence that they have been waiting for (2011, p259). The second set of women who are involved in JDP politics are the women described as ‘pious and conservative’ by Sahin (2011, p13). These women are usually involved in the women’s branch of the party, Nur Vergin an active participator in JDP gender politics believes that the JDP ‘represent the liberal wing of the Islamic movement’ and owes their success to managing and enabling ‘women’s organizations to be operational’ (Sozen, 2006, p260). Fatma Bostan Unsal, a founding member of the party positively supports the claims that Erdogan works well with women she stated in an interview that ‘Mr Erdogan became mayor thanks to his working together with women, although he does not speak about it openly, (and) he knows how to work with women’ (Sozen, 2006 p260). The third set of women Sozen describes are the Women Parliamentarians, the chosen women are usually westernized and do not veil. Sahin explains the reason behind a lack of veiled women involved in their politics at parliamentary level; she states in her writings that Erdogan will not answer to the ‘no headscarf, no votes’ protests initiated by female activists, due to the troubles his struggles to lift the headscarf ban caused him (2011, p9). A female Parliamentarian, Guldal Aksit, proudly states that they have several new projects to alleviate women in Turkish society, projects such as 1000 jobs and food for 1000 women (Sozen, 2006). The difference in discourse between JDP supporting females and opposing women’s groups is the fact that the JDP women are accepting in that the identity of the Turkish women ‘is the identity that is defined within the context of collective cultural value’ (Sozen, 2006, p261). It is distressing for feminists to see that in the JDP government ‘Women who are pioneers of change and transformation are replaced by the ones who have accepted the central policies in the center right party’ (Sozen, 2006, p261). 

Nonetheless, the economist predicts that the number of women elected to take seat at parliament is expected to double. Even if the figure doubles Turkey will still be lagging behind other Islamic countries including Afghanistan who have 28% participation by females and the United Arab Emirates who have 23% female participation in politics (2011).

Women in Society

The private is political; a statement feminists’ in Turkey have been trying to embed into the culture of Turkish society for decades. It is in the conservative nature of the Turkish culture, to keep the home life as a private haven away from public scrutiny, Silverstein argues that ‘The institutionalization of a distinction between the public and the private is considered central to the functioning of liberal political culture, as is the situating of religion in the private’ (2008, p119). Only recently have we seen laws change in Turkey in favour of women who have been victimized by their spouse and have circum to domestic violence. Police have often made an effort to stay out of domestic violence cases and women are regularly persuaded to go back to their husbands where they belong ‘on the grounds that family unity must be preserved’ (Economist, 2008). This is the case usually with lower class uneducated women who have no financial freedom and security outside of their marriage (Economist, 2008). This mentality has impaired the process of modernization from fully evolving hence the issues being tackled at government level usually focus on the public face of women rather than their domestic rights, therefore feminists groups have prioritized on their agenda raising issues regarding ‘relations between men and women, not in the public field but in personal relationships’  (Tekeli, 2006, p194)

The efforts of feminist groups and women’s organizations alongside the constitutional and legal changes are not enough, in Turkey’s case, the JDP has been credited for the reforms since its leadership regarding the protection of women, however ‘the laws are… spottily implemented’ (Economist, 2008). As Tekeli states ‘changing laws is an important part ofthe struggle, but it is not enough to end discrimination’ (2006, p198). She adds that in order to allow a law to be acknowledged the public must be aware of it and have access to support, there is no use in having laws against domestic violence when the women have no shelters and support groups to flee to (Tekeli, 2006, p198). The implementation of punishment and enforcement of law is lacking in effort by the authorities, a study published in an Economist article shows that ‘Turkey ranks with Russia as one of the worst countries in Europe for abuse of women’ and that the situation is not getting better, a report by the Human Rights Watch published in the same article finds ‘that 42% of women (in Turkey) over 15 have suffered physical or sexual violence’ (2011). The rocketing figure of female murders is also a disturbing fact with the murder rate of women increasing by 1400% since 2002 (Cumhuriyet, 2010).

Many opposing scholars find Erdogan to be the catalyst behind the mentality, which is a barrier for the liberation of women and feminist discourse. Gulbahar is a feminist lawyer who agrees with the above claims, she states that it was Erdogan who set the tone;  ‘His diatribes against divorce and calls for women to bear at least three children have made things worse,” (Economist, 2011). The last claim has brought me back to my neoliberal analysis, Cosar and Yegenoglu argue that despite the possibility that neoliberal patriarchy could create a medium for women to increase their participation in the Turkish economic environment; it may expect women to both have input in the economy and participate in the work force and to attend to their household chores ‘In other words, it expects them to adjust to the increasingly flexible market conditions, while maintaining the normalised wifehood and motherhood roles (2011, p11; Cosar & Ozman, 2009). A study published in the Economist shows that Turkey’s ranking is 126^th among 134 countries in the Global Gender Gap Index (2011), a study conducted the year before and again published in the Economist showed that since the JDP leadership female participation in the work force had decreased to 26% by 2010 since 1989, which had a 34% participation from females (2010). 

The backlash feminists have been facing in Turkish society stems from ‘Turkey’s articulation into the neoliberal world system’. This has in turn resulted in allegations towards the feminists that they are ‘instigators of moral corruption as well as divergences within the feminist movement itself.’ (Cosar and Yegenoglu, 2011, p6). The JDP community and supporting press held feminists responsible for he rupture and disintegration of the traditionally accepted family structures and the values that surround it. Gursozlu argues that normalization of thought regarding feminist discourse is a disturbing fact, which is impairing the modernization and democratization process of Turkey (2008). Feminists have been ostracized and ‘accused of playing against nature and the morals of the society’ (Cosar and Yegenoglu, 2011, p6; Gursozlu, 2008; NTV, 2008). With feminism growing in strength it is feared by the patriarchal culture of Turkey that this discourse will reduce the power of the male dominated society. 

Several studies have been conducted to analyse the effects of neoliberalism on Turkish society, Kahraman states that during the neoliberal times in Turkey there is a clear decrease in the female rate of employment (2008, p54/55), in the study it was noted that ‘Turkey is among the 10 countries with the lowest rate of female employment’ (Cosar & Yegenogly, 2011, p7). Tekeli, believes that one of the reasons behind the decreasing rate of female employment is down to the shifts from agricultural towns to larger cities, hence women who were part of the labour force, working without pay on a family plot, lost their jobs and were forced to be stay at home mums, dependant housewives and have at least three children. Only a small group of women who are very well educated in professional industries represent 6% of female employment (2006, p198). Caha has also observed that ‘The less educated are more likely to have traditional attitudes than are the more- educated in that’ (2010, 149).

On a positive note, Turkey is a very multicultural and populated culture, there are many whose voices are being heard, the reformed penal code brought in harsher punishments for honour killings, and imams (religious community leaders) have been directed by the head of the religious authority to promote the ‘humane treatment of women in their sermons’ (Smith, 2005, p322). If the authorities follow through what the democratic members of the public are trying to achieve, the reformations and placed laws will have a significantly positive effect on women’s place in society. However, at times the hard work of the organizations and individuals battling for equal rights and modernization can be dismissed by Erdogan’s referencing to his traditionalist background, Smith claims his ‘biggest gaffe in office’ was the attempt to criminalize adultery in 2004 (2005, p322). When questioned about the ill affects it could have on Turkey’s relationship with the European Unions he argued  ‘that just because Turkey wished to join the EU, it did not have to adopt Europe’s ‘imperfect’ morals’ (Smith, 2005, p322).

The JDP have shown great importance to moral principles and to increase human welfare, Cosar and Ozman state that the JDP ‘refers to the emphasis on a moralist approach to politics as evidence of the conservative identity of the party’ (2010, p66). Erdogan and his party members oppose to the economic approaches rather than moralistic approaches to politics as they do not aim to crease human welfare, an important aspect of their success. Cosar and Ozman give the example of the partys’ proposition to improve ‘child caring services in those families in which both of the spouses work and to provide the means for granting social security services to housewives’ (2010, p67). When analysed in terms of ‘conservative democratic ideology’ this shows that the moral and economic welfare of the individual starts with the family (Cosar & Ozman, 2010, p66/67). Kahraman also agrees with the above claim and expands on its implications, he argues that this emphasis on the traditionalist social culture related to JDPs ‘taking part in the neo-conservative criticism of the negative effects of ‘liberal democratic capitalism’, one of these negative effects being the ‘loss of paternal authority’ (Cosar & Ozman, 2010, p66/67; Kahraman, 2008, p54/55).

As we can witness in the JD party program there is no room for individualistic attributes, the only time we see reference to individualism and individual freedom is though the headscarf ban politics, where they argue that expression of religious beliefs is an individual right. However true that is in a democracy, opposing members of the public and members of opposition parties refer to the political symbol the headscarf has become and claim that it is a threat to the secular ideology Turkey is formed upon. Thus making the only individualistic feature in their program a controversial one. 

Methodology

Basing my project purely on secondary and normative research did not feel adequate when gathering information. The use of empirical research in this study is extensive, this has been possible, as I have spent a vast amount of time observing, collecting primary research and involving myself in the communities that hold relevance to my research.

My secondary research extended to government statistics, literature review on many theoretical and historical writings about Turkish politics and the question of women. I started my dissertation research with reading and analyzing literature already published in my area of interest. I made a point to read text published not only by Turkish scholars or academics but also from both western society and eastern society. It was very interesting to gain perspective from a European writer and a Middle Eastern writer, by utilizing this technique I was able to grasp a better-rounded knowledge about this topic. However, this type of research is limited as the debates on secularism, JDP mentality and opinions of the public are fast moving and ever changing. 

As this is a very current and ongoing topic one must have a hands on approach to it and constantly track the on goings. For this reason, I chose to travel to Turkey several times in the months I worked on my dissertation. During the first 3 trips, I was a keen observer; I was observing family conversations, attitudes on the streets and of course dress codes of women and how they protruded their religious or non-religious identities. Being a Turkish citizen and having the chance to travel there regularly, I was experiencing first hand the changes in the atmosphere from the beginning of the JDP leadership. I have been able to witness the hostility between the very conservative and the very secularist; hence I have included much of that experience in my study. During my final visit, I was lucky enough to secure appointments at several women’s NGOs, rather than conducting an interview, I was pleasantly surprised to have the opportunity to talk privately for hours with one of their members. Our talks consisted of the NGOs giving me up to date information, including statistics and from their personal experiences, newspaper articles, access to their publications and the opportunity to keep in contact even on my return to London. 

However, there are several drawbacks I have come across, my main source of primary/empirical information has been provided by the Association for the Support of Contemporary Living. This association is an ultra Kemalist organization; they are in complete opposition to the current JDP government. According to Saliha Esen a representative for the Association for the Support of Contemporary Living they come across several problems and battle their way through every day as their ideologies and their activism are too extreme for the current status of society, according to some members of the local councils (2011).  Therefore, one can imagine the information passed on to me to be very biased. This has resulted in much of my empirical research to be one sided, thus I had to conduct secondary research to create a more balanced study. I chose to conduct my research using both primary and secondary research, the primary research gives me first hand experience of the situation however the literature already published (books, journals, documentaries) made it possible to understand the issues through the use of theory. Finally, I used newspaper articles extensively in my study, this was because of the nature of Turkish journalism. Regardless of the many censorships journalists and newspapers face from a governmental level, the public are hungry for news especially ones which are controversial and ones that could directly affect their daily lives. All the newspapers in Turkey have a political identity, with the breaking news published almost at the same time as the event, the language used due to its political direction made the information interesting to read and analyse. Therefore, by analyzing the press, I was able to gain great amounts of knowledge, not only about specific events but the socio cultural identities of the readers and the mentality of the producers. Using press as a reference point in my study was very useful for the analyses of views on the political participation of women in Turkey and how the political activism of women was portrayed. Marshall argues that ‘the coverage of gender quotas (in Turkish press) was determined not only by the position of each newspaper on gender equality, but also by the larger ideological dispute over Islamism versus secularism, and by clashing political interests and alliances between the media and political parties’ (2011, p573). 

Findings

My findings became very evident during my research; it is very evident that there have been many changes in the constitution and laws regarding women’s rights and their position in society and politics. The apparent difference in mentality within the Justice and Development party has clearly transferred into the minds of their supporters. This has directly resulted in impairment in the fight for women’s rights.

It is undeniable that the JDP government has successfully attained growth rates and major democratic reforms, however Tezcur argues that they also began in a speedy manor to mature ‘into a patronage-distributing and hierarchical organization with very limited pluralism and grassroots participation in decision-making.’ Very much resembling the past Islamist parties they are so afraid of being affiliated with (Tezcur, 2007). Nevertheless, Sahin claims that a vast amount of religiously orientated conservative women found the JDP as a medium to seek ‘achievement, recognition, and a collective Islamic female identity (2011).

We can see from the above research and analyses that women have had and still have very little input into Turkish politics outside of the electoral democracy. Women are very conspicuous in the public eye during election periods and then find themselves hidden in the backgrounds, organizing social events once the elections and political campaigns are over. There are very few women who take part in the complete democratic process. As cultural structure and tradition determine gender politics in Turkey, women are expected to ‘perform the social and cultural roles attributed to them’, hence, ‘politics in this respect is maintained by the cultural code of Turkish society’, which is primarily male dominated (Sozen, 2006, p270). 

The main area of concern, which has been mentioned on several occasions, is the lack of implementation in laws to protect women’s rights. Regardless, of the modernized nature of the reforms and regulations without the mentality stepping out of its traditional cultural norm women will always be subordinated figures in Turkish society. As an example, in the constitution there is a clause that states the equality of women and men, there is also laws against having more than one wife, and increased punishments to committers of domestic violence. The mayor of Tuzla (a province in Istanbul) is a prime example of the lack of implementation for the above listed laws. He was caught handing out booklets called ‘Aile Ilmihali’ (a family guide book according to the principles of Islam), this booklet consisted of a set of rules a married couple should abide by, some of these guidelines included, having four wives, beating your wife without marking her face, the acknowledgment that a woman is a second class citizen, family planning is not allowed (Radikal, 2005; Tumgazeteler, 2005; Sabah, 2005) and other perverted interpretations of Islamic principles. The mayor of Tuzla represents the JDP therefore represents the mentality of the majority (Halilozen, 2005).

Since the leadership, habits in society have been changing and these changes are not kept quiet, with the anticipated visit of Erdogan to a city called Kars in Turkey, saw the removal of their renowned bare breasted female statue. Run by the fear of offending Erdogan and not showing consideration to the conservative culture he represents the mayor decided to keep the statue down for Erdogan’s visit. Erdogan had not visited and the statue was placed in its original position, the Economist argued that this specific incident reflected on the mentality of Erdogan and the rest of the JDP (2008). This disposition is more apparent in the rural ‘backwaters’ of Turkey, another incident occurred in Tarsus in the east Mediterranean where two girls were attacked with acid because the attackers thought their skirts were too short (Economist, 2008).

It is not a surprise that the rates of murder among women have increased, the rates of female employment have decreased and women are bound to being housewives in the type of environment Erdogan and the JDP have made available to their public (Esen, 2011). Smith argues whether the political Islam has changed its appearance under the JDP leadership and progressed in a ‘new kind of politics’ (2005, p314). If that is the case, this ‘new kind of politics’ created by the JDP, Turkey has been witnessing contrasting discourse and ideologies in almost all parts of the JDP’s social politics. Smith contests that the centerpiece of the JDP social politics is influenced by ‘Turkey’s Islamic heritage’ and has lead Erdogan to act as though he is leading an Islamic community rather than a multicultural nation.’ (2005, p318).

Habitual changes in the daily lives for Turkish members of the public reaffirm my findings of the spreading of this traditionalistic mentality facilitated by Erdogan. Females working in schools as teachers have been scrutinized for wearing shirts and blouses with short sleeves and food and drink in the workplace are being forbidden during the fasting hours of Ramadan (Economist, 2008) completely disregarding the possibility of other faiths being practiced in the same environment. These claims go hand in hand with the attitudes of most members of parliament representing the JDP. These also show the lack of respect and acknowledgement to the democratization process Turkey is trying to progress through. The strengthening popularity of religiously conservative ideology in the public has created a separation not only between the general public but within women too. The focus on individual rights for the lifting of the headscarf ban has not been apparent in other aspects of female individualism. During my research it became evident that feminists resent the type of woman fighting for their individual right to access society and politics wearing a headscarf but conforming to the other elements of male domination and the patriarchal nature of the culture. 

The unbalanced structure of this ‘conservative democracy’ shows the JDPs ‘inability to balance economic and moral values’ (Sozen, 2006, p572). Sozen goes on to explain that this imbalancement could be saved by women who could ‘be the determinants of the moral aspect of this balance, but insufficient public discourse makes the women’s position obscure’ (2006, p572). The public opinion engineered by the leadership has a decisive impact on issues relating to females and their rights in Turkish society.

One of the most important findings I have come across is the strength and motivation prevalent in women’s movements. Charities and Non Governmental Organization’s are highly active in trying to increase the participation of women in society, politics and education. The active role of feminists and the resistance of the JDP present the fact that they are not yet ready to accept modernization and the discourse that follows it. JDP women will not be slaves to feminism, are words that Erdogan supported and shared with the public by yet another one of his mayors representing the JDP in the capital Ankara, from a Western perspective this mentality is not welcomed in Europe, therefore prevent the accession negotiations from progressing (NTV, 2008).

Nevertheless, realizing Turkey’s conservative nature and its inclination towards modernization, Heper and Toktas claim that ‘a marriage between Islam and democracy in Turkey can be consummated if the radical secularists stop trying to impose their preferred life-style and set of values upon the Islamists, and if the latter do not undermine by word or deed the basic tenets of the secular democratic state in Turkey’ (2003, p274).

Conclusion

This project has been a very challenging one due to the nature of this topic. As I chose a very current affair, the speedy emergence of new incidents, theoretical approaches and the ever-changing public opinion added to the difficulty in gathering research and evidence for my findings. The aim of my research was to find out how the question of women changed since the leadership of the JDP, I believe that I have established the scenario and was able to come to a conclusion that despite the changes in the constitution and the laws Turkey still lacks in implementation. The traditionalistic and very conservative mentality that is very clear in the members of the party and the majority of their supports creates hurdles in the process of modernization. 

I came across many limitations during my research process; I found that there was a lack of balanced information regarding the JDP politics. Much of the mainstream media in Turkey are either government owned or bought my rich entrepreneurs who have ties with the JDP. This made it difficult to find information that is unbiased, therefore forcing me to use archives more extensively than I expected. 

My conversations and meetings with various NGO’s and members of the Turkish public were not as satisfying as I would have liked them to be. I was hoping to meet more people and gain more insight knowledge. Due to time constraints and financial limitations I was not able to fly to Turkey once again to gather more information. If I were to do this project over again, I would include much more input from certain demographics and utilise their experiences. A more extensive analysis and research into Turkish press is also something that I would like to look into more. As I was progressing through my research, I found the significance that mainstream media had on Turkish society.  I have also learnt that I should manage my time better, this would directly result in a more quality piece of work, however my efforts to develop my time management was not as successful as I wished them to be. I believe that with better time management, I would have been able to grasp the theoretical approaches and critically analyse at a more advanced level. Therefore, a better analysis of the theoretical approaches would have resulted in a more rounded paper. Speculating on my research process, another improvement would have resulted from contacting government officials and the JDP women’s branch. I found that much of my personal interactions with the Turkish public were very biased, although my position was clear from the start it would have been a better experience if I had empirical research directly from the JDP representatives. 

This is a topic that has captured my interest very much, there are too many aspects relating to the female positioning in Turkish society, there are extensive studies in many of the areas I touched upon briefly. To develop all these ideas and continue with researching into the question of women would be the next step for me after this project. Due to the ever-changing nature of this topic, I can speculate that there will be differences over the next year’s even months. Erdogan’s recent victory to stay in leadership for one more term is predicted to change many social norms in Turkey. We may see Turkish develop into a more traditionalistic society and increasing its bonds with the Middle East, or the JDP could create a balance and continue with the modernization process Turkey has been struggle to maintain. At this current situation it could go both ways, if I continue with my research in this field, it will be very interesting to compare my findings from now to what will cross my way in the future. 

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